This essay offers a rational political explanation for the notorious inefficiency of pork barrel projects with an optimization model of legislative behavior and legislative institutions. The model emphasizes the (economically arbitrary, from a welfare point of view) importance of the geographic incidence of benefits and costs owing to the geographic basis for political representation. We explore the implications of a legislator's objective function and derive conditions under which a representative legislature will select an omnibus of projects each of which exceeds the efficient scale.
Pj (x) are both benefits and costs. Let b(x) represent the present value of the economic benefits which flow from the project to the particular political constituency. This includes consumption benefits, say cleaner water from a sewage treatment plant, and potential pecuniary gains to producers, for example, increased profits to project input owners from price rises in factor markets. 
We assume a tax system that covers all expenditures, assigning nonnegative tax share ti to the ith district, where Vi=, ti = 1 and n is the number of districts. The tax bill for the ith district for the project Pj(x), therefore, is ti[c1(x) + c2(x)]. As the above development suggests, there are several mechanisms at work in the realm of distributive policy which our model captures. First, economic benefits are geographically concentrated in a politically relevant way. Second, production costs may be unpacked, again in a politically relevant way. Some costs are extracted from the economy and returned as geographically earmarked expenditures-c1(x) and c2(x); other costs are nonexpenditure in nature, imposed on the local economy in which the project is located-C3(X). Third, the tax bill, T(x), is paid for by each political subdivision according to the tax shares ti, i = 1, . . . , n. The relevant mechanisms which we examine 3 Some students of cost-benefit analysis, e.g., McKean (1958, chap. 8), argue against including pecuniary external effects in the calculations, claiming instead that these constitute distributional effects that are not germane for efficiency determinations. The treatment of pecuniary external effects remains controversial in cost-benefit analysis. Our results reported in this paper do not depend on how this controversy is resolved. 4 There is a fourth component of costs, namely, nonexpenditure real resource costs that spill over into other political constituencies. Since Pj (x) is a concentrated project, we ignore this for the present. We return to this point in the concluding section. For analysis of other kinds of policies not possessing the particular properties of distributive projects, see Shepsle and Weingast (1980) . below are (1) the political cost-accounting mechanism, (2) the districting mechanism, and (3) the taxation mechanism. After examining these mechanisms and their effects on the characteristics of distributive policy, we explore the complementarity of legislators' reelection objective. First, however, we develop the familiar efficiency criterion.
Model E: Maximizing Economic Efficiency
The benchmark for the entire set of political institutions developed below is the efficiency criterion. This requires the maximization of economic net benefits. This is given simply by max E(x) = b(x) -c(x).
The familiar first-and second-order conditions are bf -c' = 0, and
bt -c" < 0.
The second-order condition follows directly from assumption 1 and assumption 2 so that the solution to (2), xE in figure 1, is a unique global maximum.
The Politicization of Expenditures
The first transformation of the standard approach is the politicization of economic costs. This transformation rests on a crucial political property. Project costs, paid from general revenues, become geographically earmarked expenditures. The political process distributes those expenditures in the form of c1-type and C2-type costs. Thus, for Pj(x) in district, production inputs are purchased from firms and individuals in the district (c1) and from their counterparts outside the district (c2). More important is the political evaluation of the distribution of geographically earmarked expenditures. While these expenditures are not lump-sum transfers of wealth to factor owners, they do entail pecuniary gains since they represent increases in demand for project input factors, thereby driving up their prices.5 Not only does 5 This statement presumes that factors of production are geographically fixed in the short run. This does not preclude the bidding away of pecuniary gains as the long-run supply of factors adjusts to this change in demand. For some projects, which are one shot and nonrepetitive in nature, the short-run analysis holds since the long-run adjustment process is attenuated. For other programs, in which a permanent increase in demand has occurred (e.g., the continuing flow of military procurement projects to a district), long-run market forces adjust with the concomitant bidding away of pecuniary the public project entail new business for input owners; it allows them to receive a higher price for the sale of inframarginal units as well.6 As this discussion suggests, geographic expenditures are important because they distribute pecuniary effects. Consequently, the distributional effects of local expenditures combine with consumption benefits in the district's valuation of a project. Put simply, a dollar's valuation of a project may come in either of two forms: a pecuniary gain to a factor owner or a benefit to a project consumer. Partly as a consequence of these distributional effects, and partly for additional reasons enumerated below, the political evaluation of pecuniary effects diverges from their economic treatment. We may distinguish several classes of agents who are differentially advantaged or harmed (in addition to their tax obligations) by the provision of Pj (x): (1) in-district consumers, who receive benefits through consumption of the public project but are unaffected by pecuniary effects; (2) in-district factor owners, who obtain pecuniary gains in production of, as well as benefits in consumption from, P3(x); (3) out-of-district factor owners, who obtain pecuniary gains in production (but no consumption benefits since they do not reside in the local constituency); (4) in-district consumers who make factor market purchases, gains. Nevertheless, the political effect is the same, though now manifested in an aversion to pecuniary losses suffered if demand were to contract (i.e., the flow of projects cease).
6 There are pecuniary losers as well-namely, other users of project factors who experience rising prices. who obtain consumption benefits from the project but suffer pecuniary losses in the form of higher prices for factors; and (5) out-of-district purchasers offactors, who suffer pecuniary losses through higher prices in factor markets (and who, moreover, obtain no consumption benefits since they do not reside in the district). Public good theorists like Samuelson, Bator, and Head, in their market-failure models of public good provision, typically focus only on type 1 agents and the nonappropriable product of public projects. Cost-benefit studies and welfare analyses (Prest and Turvey 1965; Mishan 1976 ) also focus on type 1 agents, limiting the role played by the other four types. These studies compute costs and benefits in consumption followed by an appropriate adjustment for pecuniary effects. But these studies may have missed the point. As Aranson and Ordeshook (1978) have emphasized generally, and Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976) for the case of regulation, it may well be the appropriable pecuniary gains and losses of factor owners and competing factor users, respectively, that drive the political production process. In this latter view, the consumption benefits of the public project-clean water, mass transit, or whatever-are a by-product of factor owners and factor users seeking pecuniary gains and the avoidance of pecuniary losses, respectively.
How these pecuniary effects are distributed geographically, and whether they are gains or losses, have different kinds of political impacts. Since political representation is geographic, legislators care about who gains and who loses in proportion to their geographic locations. We assume that local gains and losses are politically more significant to the legislator's objectives (reelection and constituency service) than nonlocal effects. Hence representatives use whatever legislative influence they can exercise on behalf of those affected locally by pecuniary effects.
Additionally, there are several reasons to believe that pecuniary gains are exaggerated and pecuniary losses diminished in the representative's political calculus. They relate to the concentration of pecuniary gains and the dispersion of pecuniary losses. First, in what might be termed the "Robert Moses effect" (named after that famous New Yorker who appreciated and exploited it so effectively), is the observation that pecuniary gains in the form of increased jobs, profits, and local tax revenues go to named individuals, firms, and localities from whom the legislator may claim credit and exact tribute. Pecuniary gains may be targeted to constituents; pecuniary losses, on the other hand, are often more widely dispersed, falling on constituents and nonconstituents alike. Second, pecuniary losses, principally through higher prices in factor markets, are not always fully linked to the effects of increased factor demand from the project in 64Q question. Indeed, the illusion may be such that pecuniary losers are unable to distinguish the source of their losses from general price inflation. Hence there is a perceptual asymmetry between pecuniary gains and losses. Accompanying this asymmetry in perception is an asymmetry in capacity to convert perceptions of gains and losses into political influence. Third, then, as Peltzman (1976) has noted in another context, gainers typically are smaller in number, more cohesive in political interest, and, consequently, better organized politically. They are capable of rewarding the local legislator for delivering the bacon in a fashion in which pecuniary losers are unable to punish. The combined impact of the Moses, the illusion, and the Peltzman effects is an exaggerated political importance accorded local pecuniary gainers. The local legislator, then, is strongly encouraged to generate projects with large c1-type components (vs. C2-type) and tends to be less concerned with associated pecuniary losses (vs. pecuniary gains).
Since, on the arguments above, there is political value in securing local expenditures for their own sake, the representative, in assessing the project Pj(x), incorporates, on the benefit side of his political calculus, both the consumption benefits his constituents obtain, b(x), and the politically distorted pecuniary effects. Since the latter depend on local expenditures ( 
Model N: Non Est e Pluribus Unum, or Every District for Itself
The next stage in our examination of political mechanisms is to partition the single national constituency into multiple, disjoint political units called "districts" with representation in a legislature. Each district, through its representative, is presumed to maximize its net (private) benefits without regard to the costs imposed on other districts. Publicly supported projects are funded through taxes which fall primarily on other districts. Hence, the benefits are concentrated while the costs are diffused.
Any political choice institution consisting of representatives of multiple, disjoint constituencies is characterized by a principle of aggregation-that is, a voting or decision rule-and by the substantive choices made under that decision rule. There are several literatures which address these issues.8 The theoretical thrust of these literatures is twofold: (1) Why is one institutional decision rule employed rather than another? and (2) What are the policy consequences of a given decision rule? Regarding the first, with special emphasis on majority rule, theorists have focused on the instability of decisive coalitions, the ex ante uncertainty surrounding the composition of winning coalitions, and the cost of organizing and monitoring coalition partners. Their express purpose is to address how institutional actors seek, through suitably arranged institutional practices, to improve their circumstances by evolving coping strategies, formal rules, and other mechanisms (called norms in the sociological literature, rules or binding commitments in the game theory literature, and contracts in the property rights literature). The second question takes institutional practices as fixed and examines the policy decisions implied by those practices. The historical origins of and rationales for institutional rules are of little concern in these latter analyses.
Our chief concern is the second question in which we assess the project choices of a legislature in the distributive policy area. In those policy areas characterized by a project-by-project orientation, the geographic concentration of benefits, and the diffusion of costs, there is abundant evidence that universalism and reciprocity are prevailing decision rules in the U.S. Congress. The former practice assures any interested district a project; the latter, in recognition of the fact that district differences translate into different policy priorities, facilitates a process of mutual support and logrolling. These two practices combine to permit packages of distinct projects earmarked for interested districts to obtain the support even of those without a stake in the package in exchange for reciprocal treatment. Empirical studies, moreover, repeatedly observe the operation of universalistic criteria. Examples include the pork barrel of rivers and harbors (Maass 1951; Ferejohn 1974 The corollary indicates that when taxes are apportioned as a decreasing function of the number of political units-for example, tj (n) = 1/n for all j-then the optimum project scale for any district grows as the polity is more finely partitioned into districts.12 Theorem 3, however, is more general, for it applies to tax mechanisms that may be the function of any politically relevant characteristic. If a district's tax share is a decreasing function of certain of its legislator's institutional characteristics (membership or influence on tax-writing committee), political characteristics of its representative (is he a committee chairman? is he associated with the majority party?), or economic or demographic characteristics of the district (proportion of families below poverty level, proportion of population above age 65), then we can associate increasingly inefficient projects with particular kinds of districts as defined by these tax-relevant characteristics. In all these cases, theorem 3 indicates that the equilibrium scale of a district's project (and, given the assumptions, its degree of inefficiency) changes with respect to some tax criterion in precisely the opposite way the tax share changes with respect to that criterion.
Institutional Incentives to Restrict Project Size
We have just shown that decentralized choice by a representative legislature characterized by a universalism mechanism, a tax-sharing 12 This analysis presumes that the only change in N(x) following a change in the number of districts is the tax rate, tj. If, however, c1(x), c2(x), and C3(X) depend on the configuration of districts, then two countervailing tendencies may be observed. Increasing the number of districts (1) transforms some portion of c1(x) into c2(x) and (2) decreases the tax share of the district. Since the first effect reduces and the second increases the optimal project scale, the net effect is ambiguous without further specification. rule, and a political objective function yields a vector of projects xN = (x4, . . , 4). Theorems 1 and 2 provide the conditions in which xf > x, i = i, . . ., n. However, 4, the project scale for district i that maximizes its legislator's political objective function (6), is computed in isolation of computations by other legislators; therefore, it does not take the expenditure and tax externalities (positive and negative) generated by those other projects into account.
In this section, we seek to determine whether or not there is an institutional basis for restraining unbridled universalism.13 In particular, we turn to an examination of packages of projects and seek to discover whether there exists a package of constitutionally restricted projects, xC = (xcf ... , xcj), with the property that xC >i xN (where >i is the preference order of district i over packages of projects). To accomplish this, consider the complete political maximand of legislatorj, B i(xl, . . ., xn), which rewrites (6) Despite the lack of unanimous preference for restriction under all 14 This view interprets our model of unrestricted universalism as a game. The choice set for player j is the size of his project, xj, when project choice is governed by a universalism mechanism. The Nash equilibrium follows from the separability of the positive and negative externalities of other projects in (10). As a result, each district makes its own decisions without attending to the externalities it produces or consumes. circumstances, legislators have something to gain by properly accounting for the pecuniary externalities of project scale selection. The next theorem provides some insight into the optimal set of projects which internalizes these effects. 
. , x4). Potential gains may be captured if
the system of universalistic project selection is amended so that, while each district is assured a project, the project scale is determined as if there were but a single district (as in model P above). Notice that theorem 6 does not assert that xP >j XN,j = 1, . . . , n (substituting X. for xC, theorem 5 shows the restricted circumstances in which this will hold). What theorem 6 does assert is that a compensation scheme which redistributes net benefits is feasible so that xP together with this compensation is preferred by all districts not only to xN but to any other omnibus of projects. It is occasionally asserted that the distributive politics game is a prisoner's dilemma in the economic sense-that unrestrained universalism produces a project package that is an economically inefficient Nash equilibrium, on the one hand, and is unanimously regarded as less preferable than xE (XE >j XN,j = 1, . . . , n) on the other. Theorems 1, 2, and 4 establish the first part of this assertion. However, retaining the political conceptualization of net benefits given in (8), theorem 5 shows that the second part of the assertion does not always follow. The collection XE is not always unanimously regarded as preferable to xN. More importantly, theorem 6 shows that even when all representatives favor restrictions, the politically optimal set of projects is x", not E X.
This discussion underscores the basic point of the paper. The efficient collection, xE, though normatively attractive in welfare analysis, is not always behaviorally relevant. The implication of the political maximand (8) and theorems 1, 2, 5, and 6 is that legislators hold no brief for efficiency, per se, either with regard to their own project selection or a package of such projects.
Extensions and Discussion
The model developed in the previous sections roots the inefficiency of distributive politics in democratic mechanisms and especially in the geographic basis of political constituencies. This latter feature produces two independent sources of bias. First, locally targeted expenditures are counted by the local constituency as benefits. Second, the districting mechanism in conjunction with the taxation system provides incentives to increase project size beyond the efficient point by attenuating the relationship between beneficiaries and revenue sources. A cooperative legislature has no incentive to remove entirely these sources of inefficiency (beyond that described in the discussion following theorem 6).
In this section, we examine several related themes and applications. Each of these is either an extension of our model to domains beyond that of traditional distributive policy or a specialization of our model to substantively relevant cases of distributive policy.
Congressional Limitation on Project Size
A well-known behavioral mechanism has operated in Congress since the 1880s that restrains the attempts of legislators to fund their pet projects. At the authorization stage, a universalism mechanism is at work-the annual omnibus public works bill, for example, typically contains authorizations for projects in most congressional districts. of the overriding importance of these projects to the local economy in the form of c1-type benefits. Throughout this paper, we have emphasized the political inappropriateness of economic net benefits as a relevant decision criterion. In this special case, it appears that even the absence of economic benefits altogether is not a disqualifying characteristic in political choice.
Generalization to Non-Pork Barrel Policies16
One of the central features of our models is the unpacking of costs in politically relevant ways in which we distinguish project costs returned 66i to the district as expenditures, costs returned to other districts, and nonexpenditure costs borne within the district. We focused, however, on distributive or pork barrel projects, defined as projects whose benefits are geographically concentrated and whose costs are spread through general taxation. Two extensions offer further insight into nondistributive policies. The first distinguishes an additional cost, C4(x), or external, nonexpenditure costs borne by other districts. The second defines another source of economic benefits, b2(x), that accrues to other constituencies as a consequence of a project in a particular district.
1. Additional external costs.-If additional external costs of the jth project spill over into other districts, it can easily be shown that the degree of inefficiency increases when governed by decentralized project choice under the political maximand, N(x). Since the model now divides externalities into their politically relevant components, C3(x) and C4(X), we can make further observations about the degree to which the political system can be relied upon to internalize externalities associated with public activities. If the externalities are not too large (in the sense that they are local and do not extend into neighboring districts), the public sector action governed by a representative legislature internalizes them. However, if they are large, public sector action may not.
The politically relevant (though economically arbitrary) distinction implied by district boundaries suggests that the public sector can only provide certain categories of public goods which are not available through private market arrangements. Hence, jurisdictional questions become of paramount importance when producing a local public good like flood walls along a river which divides two political jurisdictions. Some of the most infamous cases of pork barrel politics illustrate this point: The flood walls along the lower part of the Mississippi River, which divides Louisiana from Mississippi, are 3 feet higher on the Mississippi side (see Ferejohn 1974 , pp. 56-58). Similarly, the levees on the Indiana side of the Wabash River are higher than those on the Illinois side. Thus, a universalistic representative legislature is biased toward projects with low C3-type costs while failing to consider c4-type costs.
2. Additional external benefits. -Let b(xj) = b (xj ) + b2(xj) where b1(xj) are the benefits of thejth project concentrated in district and b2(xi) are the benefits consumed by residents of other districts (presumed zero throughout the body of the paper). That is, b2(xi) is the positive consumption externalities (as compared with c2[xj], which are the positive production externalities).
Because the benefits outside the district are not readily internalized under a distributive policy mechanism, large multidistrict (multistate) projects are likely to be rare relative to projects with concentrated local benefits. Consequently, multidistrict public goods (in the economic sense) are not only likely to be underproduced by a market mechanism but by a representative legislature as well (see Aranson and Ordeshook 1978) . A universalistic representative legislature is biased toward projects with high b1-type benefits, while failing to internalize b2-type benefits. Thus, both positive and negative externalities adversely affect public as well as private provision.
Conclusion
Throughout this paper we have focused on the sources of inefficiency in public decision making. Our model demonstrates that democratic institutions play an important role. Three mechanisms were shown to influence the politically optimal project choice: the political costaccounting mechanism, the districting mechanism, and the taxation mechanism. These features of the political economy systematically transform the economic benefits and costs into political counterparts. Since it is the latter that determine the maximands for political actors and not their economic counterparts, these govern political choice. While our modeling of the districting and taxation mechanisms is straightforward and uncontroversial, there are circumstances in which our treatment of the incidence of gains and losses from local expenditures is implausible. We have presumed that pecuniary gainers figure more prominently than pecuniary losers in a legislator's reelection constituency. However, under some circumstances this may not be true. A legislator's reelection constituency, for example, may be dominated not by factor owners of a public project but by those who would bear the brunt of the pecuniary losses and the nonpecuniary external costs of the project. We would not, therefore, expect the legislator to seek such projects. Indeed, since the menu of distributive programs is sufficiently diverse, there normally is something available for everyone. Thus we tend to find reclamation projects in the West, locks and dams in river districts with an active construction industry, and wildlife refuges in Sierra Club districts. Because of this diversity in policy preferences and program categories, the logic supporting the political distortion of pecuniary incidences continues to hold. Our principal conclusion is that since political institutions fundamentally alter the perceptions and incidence of benefits and costs, they systematically bias project choices away from the efficient outcomes. In the context of distributive politics, this was shown to imply larger projects and programs than are economically warranted.
